The launch node as its own line item

Three launcher categories

Before the split, a map of the field. Fielded launchers fall into three categories (defined in our reference glossary) — and the public examples make each concrete:

The standalone field is maturing fast: Naval Group's MPLS, for one, validated a ready-to-fire configuration in November 2025, began land trials in January 2026 and targets sea trials in Q3 2026, with four interchangeable munition modules.

A structural split in how launchers are bought

For most of the missile era the launcher and its munition were bought together, as one programme. In 2026 that is visibly changing: procurement is starting to contract the launcher (or launch node) and the rounds it fires on separate tracks.

Public examples make the pattern concrete — the US M270 received a launcher-only upgrade valued at $451 million with zero munitions attached (2024); the European EuroPULS / MARS 3 programme is marketed with "munitions à la carte" — in practice rockets, the Naval Strike Missile, SkyStriker loitering munitions and a future JFS-M round; and the US LASSO fire-control units are budgeted apart from the all-up rounds (FY25: 54 fire-control units against 434 rounds; FY26: 98 fire-control units against 294 rounds — the counts move independently).

Poland's PILICA+ air-defence contract is a single deal, but its launcher vehicles and the missiles they fire appear as separate itemized lines — 44 iLauncher vehicles at roughly $139 million against about £1.9 billion of CAMM effectors. Germany's MARS-3 framework likewise places launchers on a separate track from munitions (five ordered, with a framework of up to 500 pending as of March 2026; Greece has ordered 36, reported at about €650 million, April 2026).

Foreign Military Sales packages show the same accounting: in the FS-LIDS sales to Qatar (about $1 billion for 10 systems) and the UAE (about $2.1 billion for 10 systems), the Coyote launchers appear as a distinct line item from the interceptors, which are a small fraction of the package — the effectors are roughly 2.0% of the Qatar value and 1.1% of the UAE value (per DSCA and State Department notifications).

The split follows a value distinction. The launcher and its cueing electronics are long-lived infrastructure, amortised across many reloads; the round is the perishable part, expended and re-ordered every engagement. Keep the node open and effector-agnostic and the buyer can shop the round on an open, competitive market instead of a single supplier's catalogue.

CAML — the launcher as a named programme

The clearest demand-signal that the node is becoming its own line item is the US Army's Common Autonomous Multi-Domain Launcher (CAML) — a standalone, host- and munition-agnostic launcher procured on its own contract, explicitly "not tied to a specific Army missile". The Army issued three requests for information in December 2025 (mobility, pallet/electronics, and integrator), and awarded an integrator other-transaction agreement to the Georgia Tech Research Institute valued at up to $33.4 million ($33,399,920) in August 2026, with a demonstration targeted as of the December-2025 RFIs (per defensescoop.com, breakingdefense.com, army.mil).

The demand has been articulated at command level: US Army Europe's General Donahue described (in a composite paraphrase of his LandEuro remarks) a top requirement for a common launcher that is both offensive and defensive capable, with a common fire-control system any nation can use and munitions from any country fired through the system. The signal is category demand, not a claim that the problem is already solved.

MOSA — open architecture as a gate

Underpinning the split is open architecture. The Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) is statutorily mandated for new US programmes (10 U.S.C. §4401), with related standards SOSA and FACE, and it is explicit in CAML and the Army's Launched Effects work. The practical effect is that a launcher which is not open-interface — able to cue in from an established C2 backbone through open, documented interfaces — is structurally disadvantaged. A common caution in the literature is "MOSA on paper": open architecture only delivers interoperability if a prime does not privately control the interfaces.

Beyond the US statute, the interoperability layer is increasingly NATO-standardised: STANAG 4586 defines standard interfaces and Levels of Interoperability for third-party control, and the newer STANAG 4817 (cross-domain common control) was first used operationally at Task Force X Baltic in 2025 and is nearing ratification.

The EU-sovereignty and ITAR context

Europe is funding this layer as it rearms. ReArm Europe is sized at up to €800 billion — a mobilization ceiling across several mechanisms, not a single pot — and the SAFE instrument at €150 billion, the latter capping component value sourced outside the EU, EEA-EFTA or Ukraine at 35%. The European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), worth €1.5 billion and in force since December 2025, emphasises munition interoperability and interchangeability.

The European Defence Fund's 2026 work programme included a multiple-rocket-launcher topic that funds the launcher only — "excluding carriers and ammunition", specified as "modular, scalable" and operable in "GNSS-contested or denied" conditions (a €25 million call). At the multinational level, six nations signed a letter of intent (12 February 2026) for a "Euro Multi Missile Launcher", though this remains a concept rather than a procurement.

The ITAR dimension is a recurring theme in these European lines: US-origin, export-controlled equipment faces friction in some markets, and several buyers — in Europe and beyond — are explicitly sourcing away from export-controlled systems. An ITAR-free, EU-sovereign launch node therefore answers a specific, publicly stated policy demand rather than a general preference.

For where the launch node fits in the counter-UAS and strike kill chain, see our counter-UAS market and kill-chain analysis.